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Abstract 
The mobile Ad-hoc networks (MANET) are wireless networks which 
utilize  mobile  nodes  for  communicating  among  them  and  in  the 
external transmission range. The vulnerable nature of the network 
causes various security threats which upset its growth. In this survey, 
initially  the  existing  security attacks in MANET are  analyzed.  The 
attacks  categories  fall  under  two  stages  that  include  internal  and 
external  attacks.  The  former  attack  is  due  to  the  malicious  nodes 
within the network and later attack is caused by the nodes which do 
not belong to the network. Then the secure, efficient dynamic routing 
techniques which are main issues concerned with ad hoc networks are 
surveyed.  Overall,  our  survey  mainly  concentrates  the  existing 
security attacks and possible routing solution in MANET.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile  Ad-hoc  networks  are  wireless  networks  in  which 
multi-hop links are used to make a communication between the 
mobile nodes. In this Mobile Ad-hoc network every node acts as 
like a router to forward the data packets to/from other nodes in 
the  network.  The  MANET  doesn’t  have  any  base  station  or 
centralized coordinator [3]. 
The  important  feature  of  MANET  is  dynamic  in  network 
topology which changes often due to the mobility of the mobile 
nodes.  The  MANETs  are  used  to  construct  a  wireless 
communication topology without a centralized coordinator [1]. 
In  wireless  communication,  the  MANET  is  a  challenging 
field for the researchers. Because of the rapid growth in mobile 
communication devices, the mobile Ad-hoc network becomes a 
more  active  field  of  communication  systems.  Some  basic 
properties of the MANET, changes the networking technology 
become a great opportunistic for the researchers [2]. 
2. ATTACKS IN MANET 
2.1  CLASSIFICATION OF ATTACKS 
The threats for MANETs are classified as follows. 
 
Fig.1. Attacks Classification 
Giving security to the Mobile Ad-hoc Network is a difficult 
task. In order to given better solution for security attack, First we 
must identify and understand about the attack. Because of the 
unavailability of centralized coordinator in MANET, the security 
is a challenging task in wireless communication. The security 
attack classification is given below:  
1.  Internal Attack: The internal attacks are initiated from the 
compromised  nodes  in  the  mobile  Ad-hoc  network.  In 
here the attacker node gets the unauthorized access and 
showing  that  as  a  normal  mobile  node. It  analyses  the 
data flows between the nodes in the network. 
2.  External Attack: These attacks are created by the nodes 
that  are  outside  the  network.  It  creates  wrong  routing 
information or service unavailability [2].  
The External Attacks have two different classifications. They 
are:  
  Active Attack 
  Passive Attack 
2.1.1  Active Attacks: 
The active attacks are harmful one this attacks prevent the 
data flows between the source and destination nodes. This active 
attack  either  may  be  internal  or  external.  The  active  external 
attacks created by the nodes which belong to the outside of the 
network. The internal attacks are more harmful and difficult to 
detect. This internal active attacks are created by the malicious 
nodes which are belongs to the network. These attacks are more 
supported for the attackers to modify the data packets and that 
creates the congestion in the network. In here the malicious node 
modify the routing information and advertise its wrong routing 
path as the best routing path. 
2.1.2  Passive attacks: 
The passive attack does not create any changes in the rouging 
data packet. It just monitors the network traffic. It does not affect 
the routing protocol operation but listen the protocol’s routing 
functionality.  In  order  to  avoid  this  type  of  attacks  we  need 
strong  encryption  and  decryption  algorithms  for  data 
transmission [4]. 
2.2  TYPES OF ATTACKS ON VARIOUS LAYERS 
The  characteristics  of  MANETs  make  them  susceptible  to 
many new attacks. These attacks can occur in different layers of 
the network protocol stack [4]. 
Layer  Types of Attacks 
Application  Malicious code, Data corruption, viruses and 
worms 
Transport  Session hijacking attack, Flooding attack 
Network  Blackhole, wormhole, Sinkhole, Link spoofing, 
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Rushing Attack, Replay attacks, Link 
Withholding, Resource Consumption Attack, 
Sybil attack 
Data Link  Selfish misbehaviour, malicious behaviour, 
traffic analysis 
Physical  Evasdropping, Jamming active interference. 
2.2.1  Wormhole Attack: 
This Wormhole attack is one of the harmful attacks in mobile 
Ad-hoc network in which the intruder makes a tunnel between 
two malicious nodes. The tunnel between two attacker nodes is 
called as  wormhole. In here the data recorded at one node is 
relayed  to  the  other  end  of  the  tunnel  and  this  data  will  re-
broadcasted to the network. Detecting the wormhole attack is a 
challenging issue. In this worm hole attack the attacker attacks 
without revealing their identities. 
 
Fig.2. Wormhole Attack 
In Fig.2, X and Y are wormhole nodes. These wormhole nodes 
are connected together by a link (tunnel). The nodes which are 
present in area A and B consider they are neighbors [24]. 
2.2.2  Black hole Attack: 
The node which responds positively with a RREP message 
for every RREQ in spite of an invalid route to the destination, 
that node is called as a black hole. It is not necessary for the 
black hole to check its routing table and in turn it is capable of 
responding first to the RREQ in most of the cases. The source 
node transmits data via the black hole node which in turn drops 
all  the  data  packets  and  thus  they  are  not  forwarded  to  the 
destination. Thereby network traffic occurs when the malicious 
node diverts the route. The malicious node has to put a little 
effort in order to create this attack. The black hole nodes form a 
group and work. 
In Fig.3, the freshness of a particular route is determined by 
the  Destination  Sequence  Number  which  is  a  32  bit  integer 
coupled with every route. The node N3 sends it to another node. 
The RREQ control messages are broadcasted by node N1 and 
N2  since  they  do  not  have  a  route  to  node  D.  There  is  a 
possibility for the node N3 to broadcast RREQ control messages 
to the node M which is assumed to be a malicious node. This in 
turn leads to false RREP control message generated by node M 
and this sends a very high destination sequence number at the 
same time. However the destination sequence number is high in 
simple AODV, thus the route from node N3 is taken as a fresh 
route and it receives data packet from the node S [25]. 
 
Fig.3. Black hole Attack 
3. ROUTING PROTOCOLS IN MANET 
The  Simulation  modeling  has  become  a  helpful  tool  for 
understanding the operation of mobile ad hoc network. This is 
due  to  nature  of  the  network.  During  the  past  few  years, 
determination  of  optimized  routes  from  a  source  to  some 
destination  in  Ad  hoc  network  is  considered  effectively  and 
multiple  routing  protocols  were  also  developed.  The 
transmission  range  is  limited  and  thus  the  data  transmission 
between the two nodes can be established using multiple hops. 
The situation becomes worse due to the mobility of the different 
nodes. The following features are essential for a protocol to be 
used in the Ad Hoc network: 
  Adaptation  of  topology  changes  is  essential  for  the 
protocol and it should also provide Loop free routing. 
  The congestion problem can be controlled by the protocol 
by  providing  multiple  routes  from  the  source  to 
destination. 
  The  exchange  of  routing  information  causes  topology 
changes to occur, so the protocol should have minimal 
control messages. 
  The protocols may become invalid after sometime, so it 
has to be allowed for quick establishment of routes [5]. 
3.1  ROUTING PROTOCOLS TERMINOLOGY 
The information about  the  linking  node and neighbors are 
maintained  by  the  routing  table  developed  by  the  routing 
protocol.  Both  the  wired  and  wireless  networks  consist  of 
several routing protocols which are classified into four distinct 
categories based on their properties: 
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A. Centralized Vs. Distributed  
The route selection for centralized algorithms and distributed 
algorithms  are  different.  Selection  is  made  at  central  node  in 
centralized algorithm while, in the later algorithm the selection 
of route is shared among the network nodes. 
B. Static Vs. Adaptive  
The  route  used  by  source  destination  pairs  in  the  static 
algorithms is fixed being independent of traffic conditions. The 
node or link failure response is considered for the change of the 
route for transitions. In a wide variety of traffic input patterns, 
high  throughput  cannot  be  achieved  by  these  algorithms.  The 
major packet networks changes the route t\between the source 
and the destination since it uses some kind of adaptive routing. 
C. Flat Vs. Hierarchical  
A  flat  routing  approach  can  be  established  by  the  flat 
addressing. Each and every node in the routing is responsible as 
it  plays  a  major  role  and  no  special  nodes  are  considered. 
Hierarchical routing is quite different from the flat as it gives 
responsibility for each network node separately. [8] 
D. Proactive Vs Reactive Vs Hybrid 
The Ad-hoc routing protocols are classified as follows. 
 
Fig.4. Routing Protocol Classification 
1.  Proactive or table driven routing protocols 
2.  Reactive or on-demand routing protocols  
3.  Hybrid routing protocols [7] 
3.1.1  Proactive (Table Driven) Routing Protocols: 
The  information  given  by  the  table  driven  protocols  are 
consistent and up to date when it is transmitted from each node 
to  the  other  nodes  in  the  network.  In  order  to  maintain  the 
consistency  the  routing  information  is  stored  in  a  number  of 
different  tables  and  when  the  updates  are  propagated,  these 
respond  to  the  changes  in  the  network  topology.  Traditional 
routing  protocols  are  the  basis  for  the  proactive  routing 
approaches which are designed for ad hoc networks. The routing 
information is maintained in the tables and thus they are named 
as  table  driven  protocols.  The  major  advantage  of  these 
protocols  is  that  the  routes  are  available  as  soon  as  they  are 
required.  But  the  control  overhead  is  significant  in  large 
networks  or  in  networks  with  rapidly  moving  nodes  which 
happens  to  be  a  primary  disadvantage.  Destination-Sequenced 
Distance-Vector  (DSDV)  protocol,  Wireless  Routing  Protocol 
(WRP), Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) etc are 
included in the proactive routing protocols [7]. 
Advantages 
  Routing  information  already  present,  reduce  latency  in 
the network. 
  High storage capacity due to the routing tables. 
Disadvantages 
  They are not suitable for large networks 
  Overhead is high 
  Cost  of  maintaining  the  network  is  high,  if  network 
topology changes frequently [9]. 
3.1.2  Reactive (On-Demand) Routing Protocol: 
The  reactive  routing  approach  does  not  maintain  a 
continuous route between all pairs of network nodes and thus it 
is different from the traditional internet routing. Here routes are 
established  as  and  when  required.  The  route  table  has  to  be 
checked by the source node when it has to send the data packets 
to some destination which makes the route discovery on-demand. 
The introduction of route acquisition latency is the disadvantage 
to  reactive  approaches.  Some  finite  latency  has  to  be  present 
when a route is required by the source node. But in a proactive 
approach, whenever the routes are needed they are present which 
speeds  up  the  data  session.  Dynamic  Source  Routing  (DSR) 
protocol, Ad hoc on-demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol, 
Ad  hoc  On-demand  Multiple  Distance  Vector  (AOMDV) 
protocol etc are the protocols included in the Reactive routing 
protocol [7]. 
Advantages 
  Low routing overhead 
  Periodic updates not required 
Disadvantages 
  Latency is high in the network 
  Not suitable for large networks 
  Low storage capacity [9]. 
3.1.3  Hybrid Routing Protocol: 
The combination of both proactive and reactive protocols is 
known  as  hybrid  routing  protocol.  The  disadvantages  of 
proactive and reactive protocols like large overhead and latency 
are  effectively  overcome  in  these  protocols.  The  number  of 
nodes  in  the  network  is  divided  into  zones  in  this  protocol. 
Inside the routing zones, a proactive approach is used and in 
between the routing zones, a reactive approach is  used.  ZRP, 
SHRP are the examples of hybrid routing protocols. 
Advantages 
  Suitable for large networks 
  Requires less overhead as compare to proactive routing 
protocols 
  Latency is low as compare to reactive routing protocol 
Disadvantages 
  Increases complexity in the network [9]. 
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3.2  DESTINATION  SEQUENCED  DISTANCE 
VECTOR (DSDV) PROTOCOL  
The conventional Bellman-Ford routing algorithm has been 
modified and a proactive routing protocol has been established 
known as destination sequenced distance vector (DSDV) routing 
protocol. At each of the node, a new attribute, sequence number 
is added by the protocol. The node transmits the packets to other 
nodes  in  the  network,  with  the  help  of  the  routing  table 
maintained at each node. This protocol is mainly used for the 
data  exchange  along  changing  and  arbitrary  paths  of 
interconnection. The interconnections are not close to any base 
station. 
3.2.1  Protocol Overview and Activities: 
In order to transmit packets and for connectivity to different 
stations in the network, routing table is maintained in each node 
in  the  network.  The  available  destinations  and  the  number  of 
hops required to reach the destination in the routing table are 
listed in this table. The destination station provides a sequence 
number which is used for tagging the routing entry. The station 
transmits  and  updated  its  routing  table  at  regular  intervals  in 
order  to  maintain  the  consistency.  With  the  information  of 
broadcasted packets, the accessible stations and the number of 
hops required to reach the particular station can be determined. 
The packets may be transmitted containing the layer2 or layer 3 
addresses. When the nodes move within the network, the packets 
are  transmitted  periodically  and  the  routing  information  is 
advertised  by  broadcasting  or  multicasting  the  packets.  The 
routing table of the each mobile station has to be advertised by 
the  DSDV  protocol.  Frequent  update  of  the  advertisement  is 
essential,  since  the  entries  in  the  table  changes  very  quickly. 
There should exist a possibility that the nodes should be able to 
locate its neighbors in the network by assigning shortest number 
of hops for a route to a destination. The new sequence number 
and  the  following  information  are  maintained  by  the  data 
broadcasted in each node. 
  The destination address  
  The number of hops required to reach the destination and  
  The  new  sequence  number,  originally  stamped  by  the 
destination  
The hardware addresses, network address of the mobile host 
are  also  transmitted  along  with  the  routing  tables.  The 
transmitter created the sequence number and they are stored in 
the routing tables. Thus the forwarding decisions are made based 
on  the  new  destination  sequence  number.  All  the  hosts  are 
updated with the new sequence number in order to decide on 
how  to  maintain  the  routing  entry  for  that  originating  mobile 
host. Metric is incremented after receiving the route information 
and  it  transmits  the  information  by  broadcasting.  Incoming 
packet  has  to  travel  one  more  hop  before  reaching  the 
destination  which  is  the  reason  for  incrementing  the  metric 
before transmission. One more factor which is important here is 
the  time  between  broadcasting  the  routing  information.  When 
the  mobile  host  receives  the  new  information,  it  will  be 
retransmitted  soon  which  causes  most  rapid  possible 
dissemination of routing information among all the cooperating 
mobile hosts. When the mobile host moves from place to place 
within  the  network,  it  causes  broken  links.  Layer2  protocol 
which is also known as infinity is used to detect the broken link. 
A metric is assigned as a infinity metric when the route is broken 
which determines that there is no hop and the sequence number 
is  updated.  Even  sequence  numbers  are  those  which  are 
originating from the mobile hosts and odd sequence numbers are 
those which are generated to indicate infinity metrics. 
Advantages of DSDV   
  DSDV protocol guarantees loop free paths.  
  Count to infinity problem is reduced in DSDV.  
  We  can  avoid  extra  traffic  with  incremental  updates 
instead of full dump updates.  
  Path  Selection:  DSDV  maintains  only  the  best  path 
instead of maintaining multiple paths to every destination. 
With this, the amount of space in routing table is reduced.  
Limitations of DSDV  
  Wastage of bandwidth due to unnecessary advertising of 
routing  information  even  if  there  is  no  change  in  the 
network topology.  
  DSDV doesn’t support Multi path Routing.  
  It  is  difficult  to  determine  a  time  delay  for  the 
advertisement of routes.  
  It is difficult to maintain the routing table’s advertisement 
for larger network. Each and every host in the network 
should maintain a routing table for advertising. But for 
larger  network  this  would  lead  to  overhead,  which 
consumes more bandwidth [11]. 
3.2.2  Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing 
Protocol: 
Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) created path 
to  destination  when  required  and  is  also  known  as  reactive 
routing protocol. Only after certain nodes send route discovery 
message the routes are built so that it communicates or transmits 
data with each other. The source node, the destination node, and 
the intermediate nodes along the active route which deals with 
data transmission alone store the routing information. Memory 
overhead is decreased; use of network resources is minimized, 
and run well in high mobility situation. Three main procedures 
are  involved  in  the  AODV  communication,  path  discovery, 
establishment and maintenance of the routing paths. AODV uses 
3 types of control messages to run the algorithm, i.e. Request 
(RREQ),  Route  Reply  (RREP)  and  Route  Error  (RERR) 
messages. The format of RREQ and RREP packet are shown in 
the following table. 
I. RREQ field 
Source_
address 
Source_seq
uence 
Broadca
st_Id 
Destination
_address 
Destination_
sequence 
Hop_
Count 
I. RREP field 
Source_
address 
Destination_
Address 
Destination_
sequence  Hop_Count  Lifetime 
The  route  discovery  procedure  is  issued  when  the  source 
node wants to establish the communication with the destination 
node.  All  the  accessible  neighbors  of  the  intermediate  node 
receive  the  RREQ  request.  The  intermediate  node  checks  the 
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the source will be forwarded to other neighbor nodes. Each node 
stores the broadcast identifier before forwarding the packet and 
previous node number from which the request came. When there 
is no reply timer is used by the intermediate nodes to delete the 
entry. Intermediate nodes will keep the broadcast identifier and 
the previous nodes  from  which the reply came  from are  kept 
when reply is received. In order to detect whether the node has 
received  the  route  request  message  previously  or  not,  the 
broadcast  identifier  and  the  source  ID  are  used.  .  It  prevents 
redundant  request  receive  in  same  nodes.  The  source  node 
selects the message based on the hop counts when more than one 
reply  is  received.  The  routing  table  is  invalidated  if  the  link 
breaks down due to node mobility. When the link is lost, all the 
destination will become unreachable and route error message is 
created which lists all of these lost destinations. The node sends 
the RERR upstream towards the source node. Route discovery is 
reinitiated once the source receives the RERR, if it still required 
the route [10]. 
3.2.3  Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP): 
In mobile ad hoc network, the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) 
is a hybrid routing protocol. The control overhead of proactive 
routing approaches is reduced and the latency caused by route 
search operations in reactive routing approaches is decreased in 
the hybrid protocols. Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) is a structure 
of  hybrid  routing  protocol  suites,  which  is  prepared  with  the 
following modules, first is Intra-zone Routing Protocol, second 
one is Inter-zone Routing Protocol, and last one is Border cast 
Resolution Protocol.  
ZRP refers to the locally proactive routing component as the 
Intra-zone  Routing  Protocol  (IARP).  Inter-zone  Routing 
Protocol  (IERP)  is  the  globally  reactive  routing  component. 
IERP and IARP are not specific routing protocols. A family of 
limited-depth,  proactive  link-state  routing  protocols  includes 
IARP. Routing information for nodes that are within the routing 
zone of the node is maintained by IARP. Similarly, IERP is a 
family of reactive routing protocols which enhances the route 
discovery  and  route  maintenance  services  based  on  local 
connectivity monitored by IARP [12]. 
4. SECURITY  METHODOLOGIES  AND 
SOLUTIONS FOR ROUTING PROBLEMS IN 
MANET 
Farah Kandah et al. [13] have showed how an adversary can 
utilize the use of multiple nodes to create a colluding attack in 
MANET.  An  adversary  can  inject  full  controllable  powerful 
malicious nodes in the network, by hiding their identities from 
other legitimate nodes in the network. This attack is named as 
the  Colluding  Injected  Attack  (CIA).  Severe  attack  in  the 
network which leads to prevent a specific node from receiving 
any  packet  is  caused  when  the  injected  node  works  together. 
Hidden terminal problem leading to collision at an arbitrary node 
is  caused,  which  in  turn  results  in  making  the  attacked  node 
unable to receive or relay any packet. Also the CIA attack in a 
neighborhood aims to delude the watchdogs nodes (nodes that 
used to monitor the behaviors of other nodes in a neighborhood) 
in wrongly reporting the attacked node (the legitimate node) as 
behaving maliciously in this neighborhood. Previously proposed 
detection schemes are unable to mitigate the effect or detect their 
proposed colluding injected attack (CIA) in MANET, as shown 
in this work. 
Arif  Sar  et  al.  [14]  have  proposed  a  method  applied  for 
preventing  and  mitigating  jamming  attacks  which  is 
implemented  at  the  MAC  layer  that  consist  combination  of 
different  coordination  mechanisms.  Request  to  Send  (RTS) 
collision problem causes the network throughput may degrade, 
for  that  reason  RTS/CTS  fragmentation  thresholds  are  also 
involved into this mechanism. The transmissions of the nodes on 
the  common  transmission  medium  are  coordinated  in  the 
Wireless  medium  access  control  (MAC)  protocols.  The  IEEE 
802.11  working  group  proposed  two  different  algorithms  for 
contention resolution. Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) 
which  is  completely  distributed  and  the  Point  Coordination 
Function (PCF) that has a centralized access protocol are the two 
mentioned  algorithms.  The  PCF  requires  a  central  decision 
maker such as a base  station  while  DCF  uses a carrier  sense 
multiple  access/collision  avoidance  protocol  (CSMA/CA)  for 
resolving channel contention among multiple wireless hosts. The 
malicious or selfish nodes are not forced to follow the normal 
operational functions of the protocols. The method implemented 
in this research study is PCF since in the link layer; a selfish or 
malicious  node  could  interrupt  either  contention-based  MAC 
protocols.  A  malicious  jammer  may  also  corrupt  the  frames 
easily by injecting some bits into the radio channel or launch 
DoS attack by exploiting the binary exponential backoff scheme. 
In order to prevent and secure the network from hidden jammer 
node attacks and prevent collisions on the network, the Request 
to  Send/Clear  to  Send  (RTS/CTS)  mechanism  is  also 
implemented.  The  RTS/CTS  mechanism  is  a  handshaking 
process that minimizes the occurrence of collisions when hidden 
nodes are operating on the network.  
Sowmya  K.S  et  al.  [15]  have  considered  a  fundamental 
security problem in MANET to protect its basic functionality. 
This is used to deliver data bits from one node to another. A 
virtual set of connections between each other is created by the 
nodes in conveying information to and from and thereby creating 
a  virtual  set  of  connections  between  each  other.  Routing 
protocols play very vital role in the creation and maintenance of 
these connections. In contrast to wired networks, each node in an 
Ad-hoc networks acts like a router and forwards packets to other 
peer nodes. The wireless channel is accessible to both legitimate 
network  users  and  malicious  attackers.  As  a  result,  there  is  a 
blurry boundary separating the inside network from the outside 
world. A novel method has been designed to detect blackhole 
attack:  ACO,  which  isolates  that  malicious  node  from  the 
network. They have complemented the reactive system on every 
node on the network. This agent stores the Destination sequence 
number of incoming route reply packets in the routing table and 
calculates the threshold value to evaluate the dynamic training 
data  in  every  time  interval.  Their  solution  makes  the 
participating  nodes  realize  that,  one  of  their  neighbors  is 
malicious;  the  node  thereafter  is  not  allowed  to  participate  in 
packet forwarding operation. 
Kavuri  Roshan  et  al.  [16]  have  proposed  a  novel  period-
based defence mechanism (PDM) against data flooding attacks 
taking  enhancing  the  throughput  of  burst  traffic  into  account. 
The basis for the proposed PDM scheme is on periods and uses a 
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result of which many data packets are forwarded at a high rate 
for the whole duration. 
Kavitha Ammayappa et al. [17] have proposed a new secure 
route  discovery  protocol  for  MANETs  that  overcomes  the 
vulnerabilities of Ariadne and Endair A, due to hidden channel 
attacks.  It  uses  'authentic  neighborhood'  for  route  discovery 
process  which  potentially  protects  hidden  channels  of  routing 
control  packets,  besides  ensuring  authenticity  and  integrity  of 
routing  control  messages  at  hop-by-hop  level.  This  authentic 
neighborhood is augmented by a process of traceability which 
uses promiscuous mode of a node to detect, diagnose and isolate 
the adversarial  nodes that disrupt the route discovery process. 
They  have  observed,  from  the  comparative  analysis  of  the 
proposed protocol with Ariadne and Endiar A, that the proposed 
protocol  has  a  balance  between  security  and  computational 
overhead. 
Saurabh Upadhyay et al. [18] propose an approach to detect 
wormhole  in  MANET  by  using  average  time  delay  to  detect 
anomalies  based  on  statistical  information  of  packets  in  the 
networks. Three features of the network are monitored including: 
the number of incoming packets, the number of outgoing packets 
and  the  average  route  discovery  time  related  to  each  node, 
throughput of the network, retransmission attempts and load on 
the  network.  The  network  is  having  wormhole  attacks  if  any 
abrupt change of one of these features is reported. The proposed 
algorithm is light weight and low computation overhead. 
The proposed wormhole attack model method works without 
any extra hardware requirements, the basic idea behind this work 
is that the wormhole attack reduces the length of hops and the 
data transmission delay. The steps of proposed algorithm are as 
follows, 
1.  Randomly generate a number 0 to maximum number of 
nodes. 
2.  Make the node with same number as transmitter node. 
3.  Generate  the  Route  from  selected  transmitting  node  to 
destination node. 
4.  Start  Counter  and  send  RREQ  using  reactive  routing 
technique. 
5.  Receive the RREP packet from the each path; associate it 
in route list with time delay. 
6.  Now calculate the average time delay. 
7.  Select the route within covariance range of average delay. 
8.  The routes that are not within the covariance range are 
black listed hence they are not Involved in future routes 
discovery. 
9.  Whole  process  (from  step  1  to  step  8)  is  repeated  for 
limited assumed time. 
G. Indirani et al. [19] have proposed a defense mechanism 
against malicious attacks in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET). 
In this technique, multiple paths are established among source 
and destination for data transmission using swarm intelligence of 
ant colony optimization. In the selected routes, the nodes with 
highest trust value, residual bandwidth and residual energy are 
selected  as  active  nodes  using  ant  agents.  Each  active  node 
monitors its neighbour nodes within its transmission range and 
collects  the  trust  value  from  all  monitored  nodes.  The  active 
nodes  adaptively  changes  as  per  the  trust  thresholds.  Upon 
collaborative  exchange  of  the  trust  values  of  the  monitored 
nodes among the active nodes, if the active node finds any node 
below a minimum trust threshold, then the node is marked as 
malicious. Upon detecting malicious node, the active node sends 
an  alert  message  to  the  source  node.  When  the  source  node 
wants to forward the data packet to D, it discards the malicious 
nodes in that path and bypasses the data through other nodes in 
alternate selected path  towards D and performs the certificate 
revocation process for defending against the malicious nodes. 
T.  Sakthivel  et  al.  [20]  have  proposed  Path  Tracing  (PT) 
algorithm for detection and prevention of wormhole attack as an 
extension of DSR protocol. The PT algorithm runs on each node 
in a path during the DSR route discovery process. It calculates 
per hop distance based on the RTT value and  wormhole link 
using frequency appearance count. Every node in a path has to 
compute per hop distance of its neighbor with the previous per 
hop distance to identify the wormhole attack. The corresponding 
node  detects  the  wormhole  if  per  hop  distance  exceeds  the 
maximum threshold range. In the routing process, the wormhole 
link  participates  in  more  number  than  the  normal  link.  This 
factor is used to detect the wormhole link using a link frequent 
appearance count. 
Reena  Karandikar  et  al.  [21]  have  proposed  by  providing 
some addition features to SendReply function and ReceiveReply 
function of AODV protocol, which has a new valid route. For 
doing the changes  they  have made a new  function, named as 
sendSecureReply()  and  recvSecureReply()  where  trust  based 
defense  mechanism  is  being  used  to  prevent  Mobile  Ad  hoc 
network from black hole attack. In the recvAODV function they 
have made some changes in type of incoming packet. They have 
changed  recvReply  (RREP)  with  recvSecureReply  (SREP). 
After adding secure reply (SREP) they have made changes in 
send Reply and receive Reply function. There name will be then 
changed as send SecureReply function and receivesecure Reply 
function. In this function they have added a new route by adding 
new pointer to AODV routing table. The new route is actually 
the entry of that node which comes along the selected route. It is 
like if the request message is coming from the legitimate node 
(source) than definitely it is a secure request, but if message is 
coming from any other node which belongs to the same route, 
may consist intermediate node, next hop node, companion node 
or any known node in the existing Ad hoc network. Then the 
route  must  be  the  secure  route.  But  if  a  request  message  is 
coming from an unknown node which has never participated in 
any communication, then this route will not be the secure route, 
the request must be coming from a malicious node, selfish node 
or Black hole node. 
Satish  Salem  Ramaswami  et  al.  [22]  have  provided  a 
framework  for  avoiding  and  eliminating  colluding  black  hole 
attacks  in  the  Ad  hoc  on  demand  Distance  Vector  (AODV) 
routing  protocol.  They  have  designed  a  lightweight 
acknowledgment  mechanism  that  will  ensure  the  proper  data 
packet  transmission  and  reception  between  the  source  and 
destination.  The  destination  will  relay  the  acknowledgement 
packets  to  the  source  through  multiple  paths  only  on  the 
reception of a set of special packets. The transmission of the 
special packets by the source will be a random process so that 
the  malicious  node  cannot  detect  the  scheme  even  by 
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Ziming Zhao et al. [1] have proposed a risk-aware response 
mechanism  to  systematically  cope  with  routing  attacks  in 
MANET,  proposing  an  adaptive  time-wise  isolation  method. 
Their  risk-aware  approach  is  based  on  the  extended  D-S 
evidence model. In order to evaluate their mechanism, they have 
performed  a  series  of  simulated  experiments  with  a  proactive 
MANET  routing  protocol,  Optimized  Link  State  Routing 
Protocol  (OLSR).The  major  contributions  of  their  paper  are 
summarized as follows: 
  They formally proposed an extended D-S evidence model 
with importance factors and articulate expected properties 
for  Dempster’s  rule  of  combination  with  importance 
factors (DRCIF). Their Dempster’s rule of combination 
with importance factors is nonassociative and weighted, 
which has not been addressed in the literature.  
  They  have  proposed  an  adaptive  risk-aware  response 
mechanism  with  the  extended  D-S  evidence  model, 
considering  damages  caused  by  both  attacks  and 
countermeasures.  The  adaptiveness  of  their  mechanism 
allows  us  to  systematically  cope  with  MANET  routing 
attacks. 
  They  have  evaluated  their  response  mechanism  against 
representative  attack  scenarios  and  experiments.  Their 
results  clearly  demonstrate  the  effectiveness  and 
scalability of their risk-aware approach. 
Yingbin Liang et al. [23] have proposed to achieve secure 
communication over MANETs via an approach developed based 
on  information-  theoretic  security.  The  idea  is  to  apply  the 
powerful  secure  coding  developed  in  information-theoretic 
security to preprocess messages being transmitted through the 
network to guarantee secure communication in the presence of 
malicious nodes. The contributions of the paper are summarized 
below. 
  They  have  identified  equivalent  wiretap  models  for 
MANETs  with  malicious  nodes,  which  facilitate  the 
application of the information-theoretic security approach 
for securing MANETs, and the corresponding theoretical 
analysis of fundamental secrecy rate limits. 
  The  messages  transmitted  securely  between  legitimate 
nodes can be viewed as secret keys, and hence symmetric 
keys  are  established  between  legitimate  nodes  over 
MANETs.  This  solves  the  open  problem  of  key 
distribution for MANETs under a two-dimensional (2-D) 
independent  and  identically  distributed  (i.i.d.)  mobility 
model. 
  The  fundamental  limits  of  the  secrecy  rate  can  be 
characterized  in  terms  of  the  order  of  the  numbers  of 
legitimate and malicious nodes in networks. These limits 
apply  to  all  possible  secure  transmission  schemes, 
including  those  implemented  via  cryptographic 
approaches. 
  The information-theoretic approach  they have proposed 
provides  provable  secure  transmission  (or  key 
distribution) over MANETs. 
All the above Attack types, security methodologies and their 
solutions are summarized in the following table. 
 
Attack 
Type 
Security 
Methodology  Solution 
Balckhole 
Attack 
ACO based 
security 
Isolates the malicious 
node from the network 
Data 
flooding 
Attack 
Period-based 
defense 
mechanism(PDM) 
It uses a blacklist to 
efficiently prevent the 
data flooding attack 
Ariadne and 
EndairA 
(Due to 
channel 
Attack) 
Authentic 
Neighborhood for 
route discovery 
process 
This authentic 
neighborhood is 
augmented by a process of 
traceability which uses 
promiscuous mode of a 
node to detect, diagnose 
and isolate the adversarial 
nodes that disrupt the 
route discovery process. 
Wormhole 
Attack 
Average time 
delay 
Three features of the 
network are monitored 
including: the number of 
incoming packets, the 
number of outgoing 
packets and the average 
route discovery time 
related to each node, 
throughput of the 
network, retransmission 
attempts and load on the 
network. 
Malicious 
Attacks 
Swarm 
Intelligence of 
Ant Colony 
Optimization 
In the selected routes, the 
nodes with highest trust 
value, residual bandwidth 
and residual energy are 
selected as active nodes 
using ant agents. Each 
active node monitors its 
neighbour nodes within its 
transmission range and 
collects the trust value 
from all monitored nodes. 
The active nodes 
adaptively changes as per 
the trust thresholds. Upon 
collaborative exchange of 
the trust values of the 
monitored nodes among 
the active nodes, if the 
active node finds any 
node below a minimum 
trust threshold, then the 
node is marked as 
malicious. 
Wormhole 
Attack 
Path Tracing(PT) 
Algorithm 
. The PT algorithm runs 
on each node in a path 
during the DSR route 
discovery process. It 
calculates per hop ISSN: 2229-6948 (ONLINE)  ICTACT JOURNAL ON COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY, DECEMBER 2013, VOLUME: 04, ISSUE: 04 
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distance based on the RTT 
value and wormhole link 
using frequency 
appearance count. Every 
node in a path has to 
compute per hop distance 
of its neighbor with the 
previous per hop distance 
to identify the wormhole 
attack 
Colluding 
black hole 
Attack 
Lightweight 
acknowledgement 
mechanism 
The lightweight 
acknowledgement 
mechanism will ensure 
the proper data packet 
transmission and 
reception between the 
source and destination. 
The destination will relay 
the acknowledgement 
packets to the source 
through multiple paths 
only on the reception of a 
set of special packets. The 
transmission of the special 
packets by the source will 
be a random process so 
that the malicious node 
cannot detect the scheme 
even by eavesdropping. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This survey has elaborated the security attacks and routing 
principles in MANET.  Initially the existing security attacks in 
MANET are analyzed. The attacks fall under two categories that 
include internal and external attacks. The former attack is due to 
the malicious nodes within the network and later attack is caused 
by  the  nodes  which  do  not  belong  to  the  network.  Then  the 
secure,  efficient  dynamic  routing  techniques  under  proactive, 
reactive  and  hybrid  protocol  classes  which  are  main  issues 
concerned  with  ad  hoc  networks  are  surveyed.  Overall,  our 
survey has concentrated mainly on the existing security attacks 
and possible routing solution in MANET.    
REFERENCES 
[1]  Ziming Zhao, Hongxin Hu, Gail-Joon Ahn and Ruoyu Wu, 
“Risk-Aware  Mitigation  for  MANET  Routing  Attacks”, 
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 
Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 250-260, 2012. 
[2]  Priyanka Goyal, Viniti Parmar and Rahul Rishi, “MANET: 
Vulnerabilities,  Challenges,  Attacks,  Application”, 
International  Journal  of  Computational  Engineering  & 
Management, Vol. 11, pp. 32-37, 2011. 
[3]  Neetu  Singh  Chouhan  and  Shweta  Yadav  “Flooding 
Attacks Prevention in MANET”, International Journal of 
Computer Technology and Electronics Engineering, Vol. 1, 
No. 3, pp. 68-72, 2011. 
[4]  Gagandeep,  Aashima  and  Pawan  Kumar,  “Analysis  of 
Different Security Attacks in MANETs on Protocol Stack 
A-Review”,  International  Journal  of  Engineering  and 
Advanced Technology, Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 269-275, 2012. 
[5]  Amrit Suman, Praneet Saurabh and Bhupendra Verma, “A 
B.ehavioral  Study  of  Wormhole  Attack  in  Routing  for 
MANET”, International Journal of Computer Applications, 
Vol. 26, No. 10, pp. 42-46, 2011. 
[6]  Ammar Odeh, Eman AbdelFattah and Muneer Alshowkan, 
“Performance  evaluation  of  AODV  and  DSR  routing 
protocols in MANET Networks”, International Journal of 
Distributed and Parallel Systems, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 13-22, 
2012. 
[7]  Punardeep  Singh,  Harpal  Kaur  and  Satinder  Pal  Ahuja, 
“Brief Description of Routing Protocols in MANETS And 
Performance  And  Analysis  (AODV,  AOMDV,  TORA)”, 
International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer 
Science and Software Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012. 
[8]  Anju Gill and Chander Diwaker, “Comparative Analysis of 
Routing in MANET”, International Journal of Advanced 
Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering, 
Vol. 2, No. 7, 2012. 
[9]  Rajiv  Chechi,  Vikas  Malik  and  Ompal  Gupta, 
“Classification  of  Routing  Protocols  in  MANET  &  their 
Pros & Cons: A Review”, International Journal of Research 
in IT & Management, Vol. 2, No. 11, pp. 28-31, 2012. 
[10] Amol  A. Bhosle, Tushar P.  Thosar and Snehal Mehatre, 
“Black-Hole  and  Wormhole  Attack  in  Routing  Protocol 
AODV  in  MANET”,  International  Journal  of  Computer 
Science, Engineering and Applications, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012. 
[11] Vijayalakshmi  M,  Avinash  Patel  and  Linganagouda 
Kulkarni, “QoS Parameter Analysis on AODV and DSDV 
Protocols in a Wireless Network”, International Journal of 
Communication Network & Security, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 62-
70, 2011. 
[12] M. Vijaya Lakshmi and S. Venkatachalam, “Comparative 
analysis of QoS routing protocols in MANETS: Unicast & 
Multicast”, International Journal of Emerging Technology 
and  Advanced  Engineering,  Vol.  2,  No.  4,  pp.  242-250, 
2012. 
[13] Farah  Kandah,  Yashaswi  Singh  and  Chonggang  Wang, 
“Colluding Injected Attack in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks”, 
IEEE  Conference  on  Computer  Communications 
Workshops INFOCOM, pp. 235-240, 2011. 
[14] Arif  Sari  and  Beran  Necat,  “Securing  Mobile  Ad-hoc 
networks against jamming attacks through unified security 
mechanism”,  International  Journal  of  Ad  hoc,  Sensor  & 
Ubiquitous Computing, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 79-94, 2012. 
[15] Sowmya  K.S,  Rakesh  T  and  Deepthi  P  Hudedagaddi 
“Detection and Prevention of Blackhole Attack in MANET 
Using ACO”, International Journal of Computer Science 
and Network Security, Vol. 12, No. 5, pp. 21-24, 2012. 
[16] Kavuri Roshan, K. Reddi Prasad, Niraj Upadhayaya and A. 
Govardhan, “New-fangled Method against Data Flooding 
Attacks  in  MANET”,  International  Journal of  Computer 
Science & Information Technology, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 25-
34, 2012. LATHIES BHASKER T: A SCOPE FOR MANET ROUTING AND SECURITY THREATS 
848 
[17] Kavitha  Ammayappan,  Vinjamuri  Narsimha  Sastry  and 
Atul Negi, “A New Secure Route Discovery Protocol for 
MANETs  to  Prevent  Hidden  Channel  Attacks”, 
International Journal of Network Security, Vol. 14, No. 3, 
pp. 121-141, 2012. 
[18] Saurabh  Upadhyay  and  Aruna  Bajpai,  “Avoiding 
Wormhole  Attack  in  MANET  using  Statistical  Analysis 
Approach”,  International  Journal  on  Cryptography  and 
Information Security, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 15-23, 2012. 
[19] G.  Indirani  and  K.  Selvakumar,  “Swarm  based  Intrusion 
Detection and Defense Technique for Malicious Attacks in 
Mobile  Ad  Hoc  Networks”,  International  Journal  of 
Computer Applications, Vol. 50, No. 19, pp. 1-6, 2012. 
[20] T.  Sakthivel  and  R.  M.  Chandrasekaran,  “Detection  and 
Prevention of Wormhole Attacks in MANETs using Path 
Tracing  Approach”,  European  Journal  of  Scientific 
Research, Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 240-252, 2012. 
[21] Reena  Karandikar,  Rashmit  Kaur  Khanuja  and  Surendra 
Shukla, “Proposed solution to prevent black hole attack in 
MANET”,  International  Journal  of  Research  in  IT  & 
Management, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 487-496, 2012. 
[22] Satish  Salem  Ramaswami  and  Shambhu  Upadhyaya, 
“Smart  Handling  of  Colluding  Black  Hole  Attacks  in 
MANETs and Wireless Sensor Networks using Multipath 
Routing”,  Proceedings  of  IEEE  Information  Assurance 
Workshop, pp. 253-260, 2006. 
[23] Yingbin Liang, H. Vincent Poor and Lei Ying, “Secrecy 
Throughput  of  MANETs  under  Passive  and  Active 
Attacks”, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 
57, No. 10, pp. 6692-6702, 2011. 
[24] Shilpa Jaiswal and Sumeet Agrawal, “A Novel Paradigm: 
Detection & Prevention of Wormhole Attack in Mobile Ad 
Hoc  Networks”,  International  Journal  of  Engineering 
Trends and Technology, Vol. 3, No. 5, pp. 571-573, 2012. 
[25] Tamilselvan  L  and  Sankaranarayanan  V,  “Prevention  of 
Blackhole  Attack  in  MANET”,  Proceedings  of  the  2
nd 
International  Conference  on  Wireless  Broadband  and 
Ultra Wideband Communications, pp. 21, 2007. 
 